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Introduction
In the foreword to the 2010 European Report on Development, elaborated under the lead of 
the European University Institute and funded by the European Commission and seven Member 
States, one can read the following clear-cut message: “the profile and place of social protection in 
development  policy  should  be  upgraded”.  Although  the  authors  of  the  foreword  suggest  that 
“African countries, EU Member States, other donors and international organizations should pay 
close attention”  to this overall conclusion of the report, the message is targeted primarily at EU 
development policy. To avoid any misinterpretation, the subtitle of the report is in fact: “ A new 
perspective on EU co-operation with Africa”; further, out of the seven priorities which the Report 
identifies,  the  first  one  is  “to  make  social  protection  an  integral  part  of  European  Union 
development policy.” 
Considering  that  from the  turn  of  the  century  onwards,  the  EU  steadily  increased  and 
widened  its  commitment  to  the  promotion  of  the  social  dimension of  globalization,  the  above 
statement and the underlying critical assessment of EU’s engagement with social policy issues in its  
external  relations  appears  somewhat  surprising.  The  first  purpose  of  this  paper  is  precisely  to 
highlight the contradictions between EU’s ambitious international social agenda, on the one hand, 
and the rationale of its recent development co-operation policies, on the other. At a first glance, one 
might expect these two policy areas to be tightly interconnected, especially in the light of the EU’s 
strong endorsement of  the Millennium Development Goals which the UN launched in September 
2000. Notably, while the first MDG refers to poverty eradication which is central  to any social  
protection system, as many as three out  of the eight  MDGs are related to  healthcare,  hence to 
another major component of social protection systems all over  the world. 
The first three sections of the paper are devoted to disentangling this apparent contradiction, by 
focussing as a first step on the vision of globalization which underpins the EU’s attempt to define its  
role as a global player in the international arena. As we shall try to illustrate in the first section, 
social equity concerns are of paramount importance in this vision. However, it is not only a matter 
of public discourse, the EU actually takes a number of political steps to strengthen its position in the  
global social policy arena. The following  two sections turn to development policy with particular 
reference  to  the  evolution  of  EU co-operation  with Africa  from the  Cotonou agreement  to  the 
Lisbon Joint EU-Africa Partnership. The main purpose of this part of the paper is to shed light on 
the  rationale  which  underpins  the  main  EU strategic  choices  against  the  backdrop  of  relevant 
international dynamics. In a nutshell, we argue that emerging powers enjoy a competitive advantage 
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in  Africa  and that  EU’s  policies  represent  primarily  a  reaction to  this  ‘uneasy’ situation  which 
however does not appear to be strategically fruitful. This argument is supported by a review of the 
‘focal issues’ which the 48 country strategy papers identify as the main targets of EU intervention in 
Sub-Saharan Africa for  the current EDF programming period.  The analysis clearly documents that 
the EU is focussing on policy areas in which it is either bound to loose out on China (infrastructure) 
or to get no return in terms of political visibility by the African citizenry at large (good governance 
and budget support). Within this context, social and healthcare issues turn out to be totally marginal 
– an assessment  which  budget allocations confirm even further and which raises a number of 
questions, especially considering that Sub-Saharan countries are  the  most off-track with respect to 
achieving the MDGs. Building on the evidence presented in the paper and reflecting on a variety of 
favourable contextual factors (including the WHO’s current critique of the single-disease approach), 
the last part of the paper elaborates on the opportunity for the EU to reconsider its current choices 
and prioritize  the  strengthening of  national  healthcare  systems in  its  development  co-operation 
policies towards the less-developed countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Summarizing, 
soft power can play a strategically helpful role in trying to build EU’s foreign policy in Africa: by 
taking stock of its undisputed achievements and organizational know-how in managing complex 
healthcare systems, Europe is in a position to skilfully use ‘health diplomacy’  to promote win-win 
solutions which can avoid its growing marginalization in the African  continent  while enhancing 
the prospects for citizens’  well-being and democratization in this part of the world.       
1.The EU’s International Social Agenda over the last decade 
In their  introduction,  Jan Orbie  and Lisa  Tortell  -   editors  of  what  is  perhaps  the most 
comprehensive study of the EU’s approach to global social policy – provide the following concise 
description of recent events: “Since the 1990s the EU’s role in promoting the social dimension of  
globalization has evolved from a narrow focus on providing core labour standards through trade to a 
broader and more ambitious international social agenda” (Orbie and Tortell 2009: 5). In fact, not 
even that “narrow focus”  was backed by a consistent  EU strategy, as one can easily  notice by 
considering the controversial debate which developed on the so-called ‘social clause’, in the context 
of the newly established WTO. The political dynamics surrounding the first years of WTO activity 
are indicative of the ambiguities which existed within EU institutions and among member states 
concerning the actual balance between trade liberalization, CLS and protectionist tendencies. In the 
light of EC entrenched agricultural protectionism - which notably damaged  developing countries -  
how should one interpret the fact that, along with the Commission and the European Parliament,  
France and Belgium strongly supported the inclusion of CLS protection in WTO  agreements, while 
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the  UK  and  Germany  opposed  it?  The  dividing  line  between  those  genuinely  in  favour  of 
improving living standards in developing countries and those primarily concerned with maintaining 
Europe’s  privileged  position  in  the  world  is  partly  masked  by  the  terms  of  the  debate.  Not 
surprisingly,  the regulation of labour standards was and still is seen by key states and actors in the  
Global  South as a  new and more sophisticated version of old protectionist  barriers.  In  Robert 
O’Brian’s  (2007: 4) words: “many developing countries have historically experienced  Northern 
protectionism in the international trade regime. They suspect that the labour standards issue will 
only be used to protect Northern markets”
In  short,  up  until  the  end  of  the  1990s   EU  institutions’ sensitivities  about  the  social 
dimension of globalization were largely confined to trade issues and humanitarian aid. The scenario 
suddenly  changes  in  1999.1  This  is  due  to  the  interplay  of   both  exogenous and endogenous 
variables. With respect to the former, one needs to recall especially the WTO summit in Seattle, for 
its impact on public opinion worldwide, and particularly within European countries.  The European 
Union was  forced to confront, on the one hand, the total failure of the Summit, and, on the other 
hand,  the  consequences  of  the  backlash  against  globalization  which  the  no-global  movement 
unexpectedly  imposed  on  the  international  agenda.  Suddenly,  all  of  the  evils  stemming  from 
globalization, especially in the social domain and the environment, entered with the evening news 
into the homes of  billions of people across the world. 
If Seattle suggested that a  western technocratic approach to trade policy and its side effects 
was no longer feasible or desirable, what really triggered a new course of action within the EU was 
the combination of this external pressure with the unprecedented institutional crisis which led to the 
resignation of the Santer Commission - a crisis in which accusations of fraud and corruption in 
development  policies  played  a  primary  role  with  heavy  allegations  leveled  at  Development 
Commissioner Manuel Marin. This added onto what was already an extremely negative image of 
the EU’s external profile, as a result of the conflict in the Balkans.  Santer’ s  resignation left his  
successor Romano Prodi with the daunting task of restoring the Commission’s credibility and re-
launching Europe in the midst of  mounting euro-skepticism with respect to both its internal and 
external policies. Prodi proved to be fully aware of the challenge, and starting from his first official 
speech before the European Parliament, the new President of the Commission insisted on the need 
to re-design Europe’s role in the international arena while at the same time overhauling its internal 
organization in order to guarantee democratic accountability , transparency, effectiveness and “a 
sense of purpose”. Organizational reform appears in Prodi’s approach as a pre-requisite for fulfilling 
1 Although less emphatically and using slightly different terms, Bob Deacon shares a similar view in an article of  that  
same year. According to the author, there are “recent signs that the Commission is concerned to inject a more systematic 
approach and a more assertive approach into what is called the external dimension of European social policy”
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the Commission’s commitment ‘to deliver’. But what exactly should external policies ‘deliver’ with 
respect to social policy issues? In  a speech on “Europe and Global Governance” which Prodi gave 
in Brussels only about  a month later, one can find some useful elements to answer the question:
“The very forces which are uniting the planet threaten to deepen the divide between rich 
and  poor  countries,  between  the  haves  and  have-nots  in  our  societies.  Many  people, 
particularly in less developed countries are aware of this threat –  as we saw clearly in  
Seattle.  In  many  people’s  minds,  the  term globalization  has  come  to  mean  economic 
colonialism –the new imperialism of the rich nations. This must not be the case. We need 
to see globalization not as a threat but as an opportunity to be grasped. We have to master  
it,  harnessing its power to the needs of the world and offsetting its less positive aspects.  
We need globalization that promotes social equity and works to everyone’s advantage – 
including the poorest nations on earth. We therefore need to devise some democratically 
accountable way of handling globalization – a new kind of global governance to manage 
the global economy. Business is going trans-national: so must politics.   […] Practically all 
regions of the world now recognize that global governance can emerge only from inter-
regional co-operation. Actors such as Brazil, China, India and Russia are willing to play a 
full part in the international system provided they have a full say in setting its rules and 
establishing  its  principles.  But  inter-regional  co-operation  can  be  effective  only  if  the 
regions involved are strong and well-integrated. This means pursuing both economic and 
political integration. [..] Our European model of integration is the most developed in the 
world. Imperfect though it still is, it nevertheless works on a continental scale [..] We have 
already achieved a high degree of economic integration. From now on, in my view,  we 
need to concentrate on political integration – establishing an area of freedom, security and 
justice, and developing our common foreign, security and defense policies. […] I want 
Europe to be at the forefront of global progress, shaping the world of tomorrow. [..]2
The  quotation contains two interesting elements: the first  is the idea that Europe should 
‘harness’  globalization by ‘offsetting its less positive aspects’ and promoting instead ‘social equity’ 
also ‘for the poorest nations on earth’. But  the claim that Europe should build up its political profile  
– and especially its external political profile  appears even more important.  To put it differently, the 
social component of external policies is acknowledged and fully legitimized but as part of a broader 
strategy aimed at making Europe a global leader in the international arena.
The UN Summit of September 2000 offered the Prodi Commission a window of opportunity 
to further reinvigorate its discourse on the social dimension of globalization. Notably, the Summit 
approved the millennium development program which envisaged a clear set of goals to be attained 
by 2015. For the first time the UN Assembly moved from generic social commitments to clearly 
measurable quantitative targets: a new start in UN policies which the EC fully endorsed, as a variety  
of concurrent Commission Communications focusing on poverty reduction illustrates.3 
2 Speech/00/115, 2nd COMECE congress, Brussels, 31 March 2000. 
3 Cfr. section 2 for reference to the specific documents. 
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Starting in 2001 the EU also established increasingly tight co-operation links with the ILO. 
Notably, the EU is not a member of the UN system4; but following the 2001 ‘Exchange of Letters’, 
the  Commission acquired observer status,  which allowed its  representative  to  intervene in  ILO 
debates.  This  move  offered  both  institutions  the  opportunity  for  a  structured   dialogue  which 
resulted  first  of  all  in  the  European Commission’s  active  participation  to  the  ILO 2004 World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of globalization and the EU’s endorsement of its final Report. 
The work of the Commission - which was set up by the ILO and chaired by the Presidents of  
Finland and Tanzania, symbolically representing women and men, and the North and the South of 
the  world -  represents  the second milestone in  the advancement  of global social  policy.   The 
relevant report issued in 2004 contains what certainly was at the time the most comprehensive and 
ambitious alternative to a merely economic conception of globalization. The report contrasted the 
latter’s “ethical void” with a “fair and inclusive” globalization which “puts people first” and which 
should be judged on the basis of its ability to provide “decent work; to meet people’s essential needs  
for  food,  water,  health,  education,  shelter  and  for  a  liveable  environment”  (ILO  2004,  5) 
Interestingly, except for two additions- namely water and the environment - the list recalls the “five 
giants”,  which  Beveridge  identified  almost  seventy  years  ago  as  the  major   obstacle  to  UK 
development and as a basis for establishing a comprehensive public social protection system5.
The European contribution to the drafting of the 2004 Report is clearly reflected, among 
others,  in the explicit reference to ‘social cohesion’ – an unequivocal  EU brand concept - and in 
the re-iteration in paragraphs 319, 320, 321, 325 and 327 of the importance of regional integration 
worldwide and of its inter-connected social dimension. Co-operation with the ILO also resulted in 
the joint signing by Poul Nielson (European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian 
Aid)  and  Stavros  Dimas  (  European  Commissioner  for  Employment  and  Social  Affairs)  of  a 
“Strategic Partnership” focusing on the following five areas: a) Core Labour Standards(CLS) with 
particular  emphasis  on  child  labour  and  education;  b)corporate  social  responsibility;  c)social 
dialogue; d) employment strategy and poverty reduction; migration and development.  But more 
importantly the Commission increasingly got involved in supporting the “Decent Work Agenda” – a 
fully-fledged innovative strategy which the Director General Juan Somavia launched in the attempt 
to reverse the long-standing ILO marginalization in the international arena. As a result, in 2006 the 
4 Since the beginning of the century the EU is being pressing to upgrade its position in the overall UN system and on 20 
June 2011 the General Assembly, in a recorded vote, adopted a resolution granting the European Union right of reply  
and the ability to present oral amendments( docA/65L.64/Rev.1) 
5 Building on the Millennium strategy, the Report further claims that “the attainment of the MDGs should be seen as the 
first steps towards a socio-economic ‘floor’ for the global economy” but it does not linger in  excessive optimism, by  
fully acknowledging the frustration and resentment expressed by African representatives, who point to the risk of a “re-
colonization” of their continent. Furthermore, the document claims that “industrialized countries’ protectionism denied 
to others the very route that they themselves had used to grow” and denounces the gap between principles and practice  
emblematically illustrated by international aid for development.
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Commission issued a Communication on  “Decent Work”6, and  called attention on the fact that the 
vast majority of workers across the world are not covered by social insurance programs. Building 
on this premise, in December 2006 the European Council affirmed “its commitment with the decent 
work agenda as a global instrument  to promote employment, better labour standards and foster 
development.”  The move received very wide media coverage and was depicted as a new frontier in 
EU’s external social policy7. In the same year, the Commission held the Vice-Chair of the Global 
Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and it Co-chaired the Education for all-
Fast track Initiative (FTI).
During the second part of the decade the European Union has also progressively increased 
its role in the public debate on global health, by approving a variety of documents.  In 2005 the 
EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) approved a program focused on 
tackling  the  critical  shortage  of  health  workers  in  developing  countries  and  the  next  year  the 
Council adopted the “European Program for Action to tackle the critical shortage of health workers 
in  developing  countries  (2007-2013)”8,  a  package  of  action-oriented  decisions  which  includes 
incorporating  human  resources  issues  into  Poverty  Reduction  Strategies  and  health  policy 
discussions, and supporting and financing national human resources plans. But perhaps the most 
comprehensive  assessment  of  the  European  Union’s  approach,  is  the  2010  Commission 
Communication on the “Role of the European Union in Global Health” 9. The above is only a partial 
list of the official documents issued by the EU over the last decade but it is more than sufficient to 
show the growing involvement of EU institutions in the public discourse on global social policy. 
2.   A new start in EU development cooperation policies: the 2000-2001 organizational reforms and 
the Cotonou agreement
The change from the Santer to the Prodi Commission at the turn of the century marks a  
watershed also in development cooperation policies. As we mentioned in the first section, episodes 
of fraud and corruption in this particular sector played a crucial role in triggering the institutional 
crisis which led to the resignation of the Santer Commission. Hence, it is not surprising that - once 
6 COM (2006) 249 final “Promoting decent work for all – the EU contribution to the implementation of the decent work 
agenda in the world”
7 In fact, during the following years it  progressively slipped out of the political  agenda,  but by looking at official  
documents,  one finds out that  “decent work” is  still  considered a priority in enlargement policies towards Croatia, 
Turkey and Macedonia; at regional level, employment and decent work have been placed on the agenda of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. Decent work issues appear   also in EU bilateral policy dialogue and cooperation with key 
emerging countries (China, India, Brazil)
8 COM (2006) 870 final.
9 COM (2010) 128 final.
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in  office  -  Prodi  immediately  engaged  in  a  comprehensive  overhauling  of  the  organizational 
structure and procedures concerning development cooperation policies. As a first step, and in line 
with the MDG strategy, the newly established Commission stated (in a Communication issued in 
April 200010) its intention to focus development policies on poverty reduction - a position which a 
Joint Council and Commission declaration reiterated a few months later11. But in fact changing the 
organizational design of the sector was Prodi’s primary concern, and most efforts were concentrated 
in this direction. In May 2000 an initial reform programme was outlined to improve the quality and 
speed  of  delivery  of  projects,  ensure  sound financial  management,  and increase  the  impact  of 
European development assistance12. In February, and then in May 2001, the Commission produced 
a rolling programme of action, setting out clearly the reform programme in terms of aims, actions, 
expected results, an indicative timetable, and the progress made13.
As regards programming and the planning of development interventions, the key innovation 
was the establishment of guidelines for the production of Country and Regional Strategy Papers. As 
a  new approach  to  programming,  Country  Strategy Papers  (CSPs)  were  supposed  to  focus  on 
poverty,  be  comprehensive,  emphasise  country  ownership,  promote  work-sharing  and 
complementarity, involve consultation with civil society organisations, focus on a limited number of  
areas, and incorporate a number of cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender equality, and 
environmental  concerns14.  Further,  an Inter-service  Quality  Support  Group (IQSG) was charged 
with reviewing the strategy papers and promoting best practice. 
In January 2001, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office was established as a single department 
to handle the implementation phase of EC's external aid.15 The basic aim was to rationalise the 
management  and  implementation  of  development  assistance,  by  moving  further  away  from  a 
geographical assignment of responsibilities to DGs and by  integrating the various stages of the 
project cycle16. DG Development and DG External Relations were now charged with the strategic 
10 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the European Community's  
Development Policy, 26-4-2000, COM (2000) 212 final
11 Statement by the Council and Commission on the European Community's Development Policy, 10-11- 2000
12 Communication to the Commission on the Reform of the Management of External Assistance, 16-5-2000
13 Commission Staff Working Paper, The European Community's development policy: Programme of Action, 21-5-2001, 
SEC(2001) 808
14 European Commission, Secretariat of the Inter-service Quality Support Group, Guidelines for the implementation of  
the Common Framework for Country Strategy Papers, 4-5-2001
15 with the exception of pre-accession programmes, humanitarian activities, macro-financial aid, the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, and the Rapid Reaction Facility.
16The project cycle has six stages. These are: programming, identification, appraisal, making the financing decision,  
implementation, and evaluation 
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and programming phase for ACP17 and non-ACP countries respectively. EuropeAid was focussed on 
the remaining  stages of the project cycle, right through to evaluation. 
Reflecting the new drive toward horizontal  co-ordination, EuropeAid was managed by a 
‘political’ board comprising Chris Patten (Chairman) from DG External Relations, and Poul Nielson 
(Chief Executive Officer), Pascal Lamy, Pedro Solbes Mira and Günther Verheugen on behalf of 
DG  Development,  DG  Trade,  DG  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs,  and  DG  Enlargement 
respectively. 
The devolution of project  management  towards the Commission's  Delegations in partner 
countries was a further key aspect of the reform process18. Echoing the principle of subsidiarity, this 
move was intended to give Delegations greater responsibility and authority for the implementation 
of EC programmes, and to allow them to work more closely with other actors at the local level. The 
principle was that ‘everything that can be better managed or decided locally, close to the field,  
should not be managed or decided in Brussels’.
At least apparently, the radical reforms briefly outlined  fulfilled  Prodi’s initial commitment 
to  “close  the  gap  between  rhetoric  and  reality”  and  to  move  “from  a  procedure-oriented 
organization to a policy-oriented one”19. The thrust of the new organizational design clearly reflects 
the concerns expressed in the concurrent  White Paper on governance. When considering this latter 
document, political and academic attention largely focuses on its implications for internal policies; 
in  fact  the  same  principles,  methods  and  concepts  were  applied  in  the  reorganization  of 
development  policies.  Transparency,  accountability,  cross-sector  planning,  monitoring  and 
evaluation  -  along  with  civil  society  involvement,  decentralization,  horizontal  and  vertical 
subsidiarity, and  multi-level governance - are  all concepts to which the operational outline of the 
new strategy explicitly and frequently referred to. Yet, one should not jump to conclusions about the 
overall coherence between internal and external EU policies. As we shall see in the next sections, 
the EU is still struggling with this problem, despite the firm political commitments taken in 2005. 
But before we move on to the policy measures adopted in  2005 – which provide the strategic 
framework of current EU co-operation with developing countries – we need to complement the 
above overview with a closer look at how EU – Africa relations evolved in this same period. As we 
17The notion of ‘ACP States’ goes back to the ‘ACP Group of States’, formally established in 1975 with the Georgetown 
Agreement , which was initially signed by 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states. Today, the ACP group of States  
counts 79 countries , 78 of them signatories of the Cotonou-Agreement (with Cuba being the exception).  South Africa  
is a contracting party of the Cotonou Agreement, but not all the provisions apply to the cooperation between South 
Africa and the EC (see protocol 3 of the Cotonou Agreement). The ACP Group of States has its own institutions and 
decision  making processes.  It  relates  with the European Community  through the joint  institutions of  the  Cotonou 
Agreement.  
18  Formally, all Delegations are responsible to DG External Relations; in practice, they are dealt with by EuropeAid. 
19 Speech 00/41: “2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe”, European Parliament, Strasbourg 15 February 2000,
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mentioned in the first section of the paper, the Prodi Commission envisaged organizational reforms 
as a pre-requisite for improving the quality of development aid but we still have not said enough 
about whether, to what extent and eventually how the Commission intended to  revise the actual 
content of past  aid to developing countries, particularly to Africa. To try and answer this question,  
considering  the  EU’s  official  statements  on  the  2000  Cotonou  Agreement  and  Cairo  Summit 
appears as a fruitful strategy: these two events  mark a turning point in the relationship between 
Africa and the EU, at least in the EU’s public discourse. Especially considering there is an extensive  
literature on the topic, we have no intention of providing an exhaustive analysis of either of the two 
crucial events.  For the purpose of this paper what is most important is to understand how social 
policy issues fit into the overall negotiations carried out in Cotonou and in the high level political 
dialogue which was carried out in Cairo shortly before.
     How does the EU want the Cotonou Agreement to be perceived outside the closed circles 
directly involved in the negotiations? If one looks at the EU website, one finds the following clear-
cut statement: “the Cotonou Agreement’s main objectives are the reduction and eventual eradication 
of poverty and the gradual integration of African, Caribbean and Pacific States20 into the global 
economy,  whilst  adhering  to  the  aims of  sustainable  development”21 The  same page offers  the 
following account of how this agreement fits into the long-term relations between the EU and ACP 
countries: “the agreement represents a new stage in the co-operation between the ACP states  and 
the European Union which began in 1964 with the signing of the first Yaoundé  Convention and 
continued with the four Lomé Conventions. Given the limited success of the main approach of non-
reciprocal  preferences  in  the  previous  conventions  and  the  need  to  adapt  to  international 
developments such as globalization and technological progress, plus the far-reaching changes in the 
ACP states, the Agreement ushers in a new approach to cooperation in this field.22”  In the preface 
to a brochure on the first five-year revision of the Cotonou agreement23, the then Commissioner for 
Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel appears even more emphatic about the signing 
of the agreement on 23 June 2000, by  referring to it as a “historic moment” and “ the beginning  of 
a new era”.  
The agreement does pay attention to specific social policies - improving education, health 
and nutrition systems – but it would be misleading to narrowly focus on them without referring to  
the   broader  political  strategy  in  which  these  elements  are  embedded.  The  primarily  political 
20 Cfr. note no. 15.
21 http://europa.eu/cgi-bin/etal.pl (page available on 4/06/2009)
22 Ibidem, emphasis in the original text.
23 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/Cotonou_EN_2006_en.pdf
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dimension of the Cotonou Agreement is clearly spelled out in Prodi’s speech at the Cairo Summit, 
which was held shortly before the official signing of the Cotonou Agreement: 
Les relations entre l’Europe et l’Afrique, déjà si riches dans tous les domaines, 
doivent aujourd’hui s’inscrire dans un nouveau cadre stratégique. L’Union Européenne se 
trouve actuellement a un tournant  de son histoire. [..] En premier lieu, il faut absolument 
mettre fin aux conflits, tant aux conflits internes qu’à ceux qui opposent les Etats africains 
[…] Outre les causes ethniques, ces conflits sont souvent dus à des dérives politiques, à la 
persistance d’injustices économiques et sociales flagrantes ou encore à l’aggravation de la 
pauvreté. La dimension politique du développement et de toute stratégie crédible visant à  
réduire la pauvreté doit faire davantage partie intégrante de nos efforts conjoint. [..] Dans 
le contexte, la coopération et l’intégration régionale constituent deux domaines privilégiés. 
Outre  leurs  avantages  économiques,  elles  permettent  de  progresser  dans  la  voie  des 
objectifs de sécurité et de paix. L’Intégration régionale ne peut s’accomplir d’un coup de 
baguette magique. [..] Sur ce plan l’Union européenne offre à vos pays son assistance,  
qu’elle tire de sa propre expérience. 24       
The above quotation appears extremely useful to place into context the social sensitivities of 
the Prodi Commission,  as far as the external dimension of EU policies is concerned. To put it  
differently, social goals are not an end in themselves, rather they are part and parcel of a  broader 
design in  which  they do not  appear  to  rank first.  Actually,  considering the  unbalance between 
economic and social priorities in the internal dimension of EU policies, this is hardly surprising. 
What the EU is striving for is having a single institutional counterpart at the continental level - 
hence  Prodi’s  emphasis  on  regional  integration.  The  EU  is  abiding  to  the  UN  millennium 
commitment to poverty eradication but this does not automatically entail prioritizing social policies; 
in  the  EU’s  approach,  peace,  security  and the strengthening of  adequate  and effective  political 
institutions along with solid economic growth appear as a necessary prerequisite to successfully 
achieve poverty eradication. In fact, in the abovementioned summary of the Cotonou agreement’s 
main objectives, poverty eradication goes hand in hand with  the “the gradual integration of ACP 
States into  the global economy.” In a similar vein, Maurizio Carbone  suggests that. “ one of the 
unofficial messages of the summit was that Europe cared about Africa, but not enough to commit  
new  resources.  European  representatives  placed  more  emphasis  on  political  issues,  notably 
democracy and peace and security, while African representatives concentrated on economic aspects, 
notably trade and aid” ( Carbone 2009, 247)
3. 2005-2007: the Grand Design of EU co-operation with Africa 
The Millennium +5 Summit planned for September 2005 in order to review progress in 
achieving the MDGs worked as a catalyser for all international donors, particularly for the EU. In 
24 Romano Prodi, Sommet Europe-Africa, Le Caire, le 3 avril 2000, Speech/00/125. 
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fact, following the September 11 terrorist attack – which occurred only a year after the launch of the 
Millennium Development program – global social policy concerns were abruptly pushed to the 
backstage. From 2001 to 2004, the war on terrorism dominated the international scenario: within 
this radically changed context, it is quite obvious that the implementation of the MDG programs 
suffered a major slowdown. But the approaching deadline for the first mid-term review could not be 
ignored: while it is plausible to argue that most international donors perceived the 2005 review as a 
constraint which they would have preferred to avoid, in the case of the EU this turned out to be an 
opportunity for stepping up its controversial ambitions as a global actor. To support our argument, a 
few words are in order on the evolution of international relations over this crucial period, especially 
transatlantic relations. It is our contention that - quite paradoxically -  the Iraqi war contributed to 
accelerating the emergence of a fully-fledged European development  strategy.  Contrary to what 
happened in the case of the war in Afghanistan, the US invasion of Iraq triggered increasing tension 
in  the  US-EU relationship  and  among  NATO members.  France  was  particularly  vociferous  in 
condemning Bush’s and Blair’s decision to invade the country, but it was certainly not isolated in 
taking a critical position. Germany was also not in favour, and in the few Member States more 
supportive  of  the  US,  like  Italy,  social  movements  against  the  war  gained momentum,  rapidly 
spreading across the entire continent. In short,  US ‘unilateral’ and aggressive politics under the 
Bush presidency  were not conducive to a strengthening of common Euro-American views on how 
to  tackle  global  problems.  On the  contrary,  they  strengthened  the  alternative  option  of  having 
Europe decide its own strategies at last, and progressively become a global actor in a world in  
which   multi-polarism  was  starting  to  manifest  itself  with  new  actors  from the  Global  South 
pressing to have a say in the international arena. Similar hopes originally emerged immediately 
following  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall:  the  end  of  the  bipolar  world  opened  an  unprecedented 
opportunity  for  Europe  which  the  old  continent  was  unable  to  grasp  -  as  the  Balkan  wars 
dramatically demonstrated. Ten years later,  the situation was ripe for a new try and for at least 
starting to put into practice the lessons learnt from that failure.  
In our view, it is against this backdrop that one can better appreciate the steps which the 
European  Union  took  in  200525,  starting  with  the  comprehensive  package  proposed  by  the 
Commission  and  endorsed  by the  European Council  in  its  meeting  of  22  and 23  March.  The 
package consisted of three main elements: a) a considerable stepping up of the EU aid budget; a) a 
25 Communications from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament and the European Economic and 
Social  Committee:  a)  Speeding  up  progress  towards  the  Millennium  Development  Goals.  The  European Union’s  
contribution, COM(2005)  132  b)  Financing  for  Development  and  aid  effectiveness,  COM  (2005)  133;  Policy 
Coherence for Development COM (2005)134.  
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comprehensive strategy on policy coherence; c) a focus on Africa in order to ensure that Africa is 
the number one beneficiary of the new approaches. With respect to financing for development the 
EU unquestionably took the lead by setting  new intermediate  targets  for  growth in  official  aid 
budgets by 2010 for both the EU as a whole and the individual Member States with a view to 
achieving the overall target of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) by 201526. According to the 
new targets, the 15 old member states were supposed to increase their contribution to development 
co-operation up to 0.51 percent of GNI by 2010, while for the new member states the corresponding  
figure was 0.17. Given that in 2003  total EU allocations only corresponded to 0.34 percent of GNI 
compared to a pledge of 0.39 percent and that in 2006 total allocations for EU 25 were envisaged to 
reach no more than 0.42 percent of GNI, this was a remarkable commitment, especially considering 
that the EU and its Member States already provided 55 percent of total ODA. In practical terms,  
Development  Commissioner  Louis  Michel  emphatically  stated  that  budget  allocations  would 
increase from  € 46 billion in 2006 to as much as € 66 billion in 2010!
Turning to the second component of the strategy proposed by the Commission, it is worth 
noting that – despite recurrent, and often over-heated, debates on the topic - this is the first time that 
the Commission issues a specific communication on policy coherence for development. Despite its 
apparently  technical  nature,  the  question  is  highly  political  and  has  to  do  primarily  with 
strengthening the integration of development concerns in the decision making procedures of non-
development policies. Maurizio Carbone offers the following useful summary of what is at stake 
under the heading of policy coherence and what are the operational implications of the new move: 
The first communication ever on policy coherence for development started from the idea that 
the committed additional volume of aid is important, but in itself is not sufficient to unable 
developing  countries  to  reach  the  millennium development  goals.  European  Commission 
therefore discussed the impact of various non-aid policies, either directly or indirectly, on  the 
achievement of one or more MDGs. In particular, it argued that the EU’s policies on trade,  
agriculture, fisheries, transport and energy have a direct impact on the ability of developing 
countries to generate domestic economic growth, which is the basis for progress towards all  
the MDGs. The EU’s policies on migration through the role of remittances; research for its 
role  in  improving  access  to  health  and education;  and  security,  by  creating  a  conducive 
environment for business, play an indirect yet significant role in the attainment of various 
MDGs.  Finally,  the  EU’s  policies  on  the  environment  and  climate  change  affect  global 
progress  towards  environmental  sustainability  (MDG7).  Against  this  background,  the 
European  Commission  identified  eleven  policy  areas  (  trade;  environment;  security; 
26 This was the original target set by the UN Summit of September 2000; in 2005, four European countries had reached 
it already: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden.
13
agriculture;  fisheries;  social  dimension  of  globalization;  employment  and  decent  work; 
migration; research and innovation; information society; transport and energy) and for each 
of  these  priority  areas,  established  specific  ‘coherence  for  development  commitments’  
(Carbone 2008:333) 
This approach found a central place in the European Consensus on Development, jointly 
agreed by the European Commission, Council and Parliament in December 2005. The declaration 
represents the hallmark of the European Union’s new strategy in the global arena. The statement’s 
official aim is to present “a shared vision to guide EU’s activities in the field of development co-
operation,  both  at  Member  State  and  Community  level.”  But  to  fully  grasp  the  rationale 
underpinning this political move, which, on the one hand, presents Europe as a united front, and, on 
the other hand, offers a distinctive and largely innovative framework for development, one needs to 
look  beyond  the  EU  arena.  By  2005,  in  the  face  of  mounting  criticism  and  widespread 
disappointment with the Washington Consensus, the two major international financial organizations 
– the IMF and the World Bank – were striving to find new strategic avenues; in fact, partly as a  
result  of  US  aggressive  unilateralism,  multilateral  organizations  in  general  were  witnessing  a 
downward trend - with the WTO stalemate representing only the tip of the iceberg. All of this, while 
the emerging economies were struggling to advance their position in the global arena.   
Against this backdrop, the European Consensus appears first of all as the European answer 
to  the  failure  of  ‘market  fundamentalism’ -  which  dominated   international  development  co-
operation throughout the nineties and well into the 2000’s. In fact,  to set it blatantly against  the 
“Washington Consensus”27, the act was originally entitled “the Brussels Consensus.” Whereas the 
former’s main policy prescription for curing developing countries’ problems was “more market and 
less state”, the European Consensus tightly anchored economic growth to institution building and 
good governance, emphasizing that both were instrumental to achieving the MDGs and poverty 
reduction worldwide - which were highlighted as the chief objective of the entire strategy. In short,  
the declaration attempted to re-orient EU’s co-operation policies but in doing so it had to take into 
account and combine a series of extremely diverse factors – ranging from the entrenched legacy of 
its economic/technocratic and business oriented aid programs to  the increasing intervention of the 
27 The vision of globalization that held the international scene until the late 1990’s is usually summed up in this effective  
phrase coined by Williamson in 1990. Williamson was referring to a very precise set of technical proposals – codified in 
a set of rules – that was first put forward by the IMF, the WB and some economic agencies of the American government  
to deal with the financial crisis that had set off a chain reaction in the largest Latin-American countries in 1982. What  
exactly was meant by the Washington Consensus and how the reforms it postulated were introduced has been the 
subject of impassioned debate among economists, and Williamson himself has questioned the later use that was made of 
this formula. In a nutshell, the Washington consensus saw development only in terms of an increasing GDP, assuming  
that dynamic growth would automatically reduce poverty and resolve distributive problems. This  approach which has  
been described polemically as ‘market fundamentalism’ emphasizes trade and financial liberalization, moving entirely 
in a vision of ‘more market and less State’. In this framework social policy has a merely residual role.
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United States28 and the aggressive competition of South-South co-operation,  particularly by the 
BRIC countries. To clarify our argument, a few words are in order. 
From the beginning, EC development policies were primarily influenced by the historical 
links and interests of member states with their former colonies: as a result, beneficiary countries 
were usually required to resort to technical staff and  firms from donor countries. In line with this 
overall approach, the European Development Fund – which was outside the EC budget and directly 
financed  by  the  member  states  –  represented  a  major  source  of  available  grants  and  loans  to 
developing countries. All of this could not be wiped out overnight, in the name of the visionary 
dream of some euro-technocrats who thought the EU could become a leading global actor at last. 
The 2005 decision to continue keeping EDF funding outside the EC budget - and therefore not  
subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament - is a clear piece of evidence.  In the light of  
these considerations, it is not so surprising that – in the second part of the declaration focussing on 
implementation issues - trade and regional integration rank first in the list of the areas on which the 
EU intended to concentrate its action. At the same time, the EU could not ignore the deep changes 
which were taking place in the African development co-operation landscape - due first of all, but 
not  exclusively,  to  China’s   increasingly  aggressive  competition.  The  concurrent  Commission 
Communication  “EU  strategy  for  Africa:  Towards  a  Euro-African  pact  to  accelerate  Africa’s 
development”29 acknowledges the relevance of the issue in the following terms:
 Recent years have  seen a number of new external players emerge in Africa, attracted by 
the continent’s economic potential and political and strategic importance. This changing 
geo-political  context  poses  new challenges  and opportunities  for  the  formulation  and 
implementation of the EU’s Africa policies. Emerging economies such as Brazil, India or 
China, have become important  sources  of foreign investment and provide new export 
markets  for  African  commodities.  China  merits  special  attention  given  its  economic 
weight and political influence. Sino-African trade has increased from $ 10 billion in 2000 
to $ 28.5 billion in 2004 and since 2000 more than 25 percent of China’s crude oil is  
imported from Africa ( European Commission 2005b: 10)
Yet, to fully understand the policy choices which the EU 2005 development co-operation 
package endorses, it is not enough to focus on the economic profile of the BRIC’s intervention in 
28 The United States stepped up their presence in a number of crucial areas, particularly health, higher education and  
new technologies. In the case of health the US   pledged to double its aid between 2004 and 2010, and already attained  
the goal  by 2009.
29  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and  
Social Committee “EU strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development”, Brussels  
12 October 2005,  COM (2005) 489 final   
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Africa.   In a very informative and insightful  essay, Max Schoeman convincingly suggests that 
“such a perspective is an over-simplification of the scope, depth and nature of the ties that bind 
Africa  and  the  BRICs”  (2011,  34).  The  author  argues  that  “the  shared  historical  experience 
characterized by Western exploitation” places the emerging powers in a more favourable position 
compared to European countries. In his view, the BRICs “interact with Africa free of the North’s 
historical baggage” and as a result, for African countries the new ties are not only fundamentally 
different, but almost automatically better. In the eyes of African governmental élites, albeit clearly  
self-interested, China’s determined support to the principle of non interference in the internal affairs 
of partner countries outbids EU’s traditional conditionality. Given this premise, it is our contention 
that the emphasis on the twin concepts of country ownership and budget support reflects in fact the 
EU’s attempt to find a way out from an increasingly difficult situation.
 Altogether, the 2005 guidelines to EU’s intervention in development co-operation appear as 
an  exercise  of  acrobatic  equilibrium between  conditionality  and non interference  -  an  exercise 
which  the  European Council  reiterated in  the  Second Africa-  EU Summit  which  took place in 
Lisbon in December 2007,  with an even greater determination. On the occasion,  the European 
Council  no  longer  referred  to  “a  strategy  for  Africa”  –  as  envisaged  by  the  relevant  2005 
Commission Communication. The title chosen for the final document was instead: “ the Africa-EU 
strategic partnership. A joint Africa-EU Strategy” to underscore - even symbolically – the message 
it was ‘desperately’ trying to convey to African countries.  For appreciating what was and still is at 
stake,  one can consider that while for strategic, peace and security reasons, the EU is interested in  
promoting democracy, good governance and  human rights, it does not want to be accused of giving 
money with too many strings attached to it, especially considering that African governments can 
increasingly turn to South-South co-operation arrangements.   
Indeed, under its apparently technical nature,  budget support is in fact a highly sensitive 
political  issue,  and  the  object  of  a  controversial  debate  by  both  policy  makers  and  experts. 
Depending on how the instrument is actually used, it can either leave beneficiary countries free to 
divert  funds  according  to  their  wishes,  or,  at  the  other  extreme,  it  can  entail  an  intrusive  and 
pervasive  control  of  the  receiving  country’s  internal  administrative  machine  and  of  its  policy 
making procedures. Especially considering the risks of patronage and corruption, many critics point 
to the fact that using budget support  is like pouring water into a bucket full of holes, without  
knowing who will benefit really from the leakages. But what are in particular the draw-backs of 
budget support with respect to the achievement of poverty reduction and the MDGs which remain 
the overarching  objectives of development co-operation, as defined by the 2005 package and  the 
subsequent 2007 Africa- EU partnership?
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 Although taking a narrower focus, the European Court of Auditors (2008)  provides us with 
some very useful elements to answer the question, in a 2008 Special Report.  The Report – which 
contains  a  wealth  of  information  on  a  variety  of  other  aspects  –  provides  a  very   negative 
assessment of the impact of budget support on health services in Sub-Saharan countries. For space 
limitations, we shall just recall the Court’s following specific conclusions: a)  in most countries  
examined general budget support did not lead to increased resources being channelled through the 
national  health  budget,  in  some cases  also because  the  beneficiary  countries  used the  funds to 
reduce their fiscal deficits; b) the Commission has not systematically sought to encourage countries  
to  increase  national  health  budgets  through  the  use  of  performance  indicators  targeting  such 
increases in its general budget support financing agreements (European Court of Auditors 2008, 
25). This last point goes right to the crux of the problem: the indicators included in the financial 
agreements signed with individual beneficiary countries and the extent to which they are effectively 
used for evaluating the country’s performance largely determine the outcome of budget support. In 
the case of Tanzania, where we carried out some field research, out of 36 performance indicators 
currently used by the Commission delegation for  monitoring purposes, only four were related to the 
MDGs.
Summarizing  the  argument  presented  in  this  section,  the  overall  architecture  of  EU 
development co-operation designed by the 2005-2007 reforms firmly placed social, and not merely 
economic, goals at the forefront of EU’s action; this, however, does not translate into prioritising 
intervention in the fields directly linked to the MDGs, like education and health. When moving to 
the operational level, the policy prescriptions which we find in official documents focus on what the 
EU describes as  the necessary  pre-requisites  for  attaining  the MDGs,  starting with institutional 
building, infrastructure and economic growth30. The above pages have tried to shed light on the 
combination  of  geo-political  factors  and  path-dependent  pressures  which  have  influenced  this 
particular outcome; the next step is to try and assess what is the exact place of EU’s social and 
healthcare intervention within this context.
4. From strategy to implementation: EU social spending in Sub-Saharan Africa 
30 In the first Action Plan (2008-2010) for the implementation of the Africa-EU strategic partnership, for instance, the  
development of  infrastructure ranks first among the ‘key deliverables of the Lisbon Declaration’; the document refers  
to specific ‘Africa-EU partnerships’ to implement a number of selected priority actions and mentions in the first place –  
as a cross-cutting priority -  the EU-Africa Infrastructure partnership launched in Addis-Ababa on 24 October 2007.    
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The best starting point to find out what are the EU’s priorities on the ground in individual 
Sub-Saharan countries is to take a look at country strategy papers. As we illustrated in the second 
part,  these are the fundamental development co-operation planning documents which set out the 
interventions  agreed by the EU with each beneficiary country. To provide an updated picture, we 
have concentrated on the country strategy papers for the 10th EDF - which covers the period 2008-
2013. The papers reflect the principle of concentration – which the EU applies also to its internal 
policies, notably to cohesion policy. In practice, this means selecting a limited number of priority 
areas and funnelling most of available resources to these areas. According to the guidelines for the 
current EDF, CSPs should concentrate the attention on two or three ‘focal issues’. In order to avoid 
being overwhelmed by  hundreds of pages, we have extrapolated the  relevant focal issues for each 
of the Sub-Saharan countries and classified them on the basis of ten major categories. Table 1 shows 
the results of this illuminating exercise31: it only takes a quick look at the functional breakdown of 
country priorities to notice that budget support, transport infrastructure  and good governance take 
the lion’s share. More precisely, out of the 48 Sub-Saharan countries as many as 24 prioritize budget 
support, while 23 select roads and 22  good governance. As one moves towards the right-hand side 
of  the  table  -  which  refers  to  more  socially  oriented  priorities  –  the  number  of  empty  boxes 
progressively  increases:  there  are  still  13  countries  targeting  water  and  sanitation,  but  human 
development, education and health are only targeted by nine, five and four countries respectively.32
The evidence  presented in the table  confirms the marginal  role  of MDG-related sectors, 
particularly education and health; however, by considering only ‘focal issues’, one obviously does 
not cover  the whole range of activities which the EU carries out in developing countries.  In order  
to provide  a comprehensive picture, we shall now extend the analysis to expenditure data. To place 
the  discussion  into  context,  we  shall  first  consider  the  overall  development  of  EU’ financial 
commitments for external aid over the last decade, by drawing from  “The Annual Report 2011 on 
the European Union’s development and external assistance policies and their implementation in 
Table 1: Focal Issues in Country Strategy Reports, Sub-Saharan Africa - 10th EDF (2008-2013)
Country Budget
Support
Good
Governance
Transport
Infrastr.
Trade/
Regional
Integr.
Agricolture/
Food 
Security/
Rural Dev.
Basic
Infrastr.
(water-
sanitation)
Human
Dev.
Education Health Post
Conflict
Management
and
Peace 
Building
Angola X X X
Benin X X X X
Botswana X
31 We want to acknowledge Fiammetta Friani’s contribution to the analysis of country strategy papers 
32 In detail, Comoros, Gabon, Namibia, Somalia and Swaziland prioritize education, while the health sector appears as a  
focal issue only in the CSPs of  Burundi, Congo (DRC), Swaziland and Zambia. 
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Burkina
Faso
X X X X
Burundi X X X
Cameron X X
Cape Verde X
Central 
African 
Rep.
X X X
Chad X X X
Comoros X X
Congo X X
Congo
(DRC)
X X X
Cote
d'Ivoire*
X X X
Djibouti X
Equat.
Guinea
Eritrea X X X
Ethiopia X X X X
Gabon X X X
Gambia X X X X
Ghana X X X X
Guinea
Guinea
Bissau*
X X X
Kenya X X X X
Lesotho X X X X
Liberia* X X X
Madagascar X X X
Malawi X X X
Mali X X
Mauritania X X X X
Mauritius X
Mozambique X X X X
Namibia X X X
Niger X X X X
Nigeria* X X X X X
* Fragile State
Country Budget
Support
Good
Governance
Transport
Infrastr.
Trade/
Regional
Integr.
Agricolture/
Food 
Security/
Rural Dev.
Basic
Infrastr.
(water-
sanitation)
Human
Dev.
Education Health Post
Conflict
Management
and
Peace 
Building
Rwanda X X X X
Sao Tome
and 
Principe
X X X
Senegal X X X
Seycelles X X X
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Sierra 
Leone
X X X
Somalia X X X X
South 
Africa
X
Sudan
Swaziland X X X X
Tanzania X X X
Togo X X X
Uganda X X X
Zambia X X X X
Zimbabwe
* Fragile State
2010”  -  which  the  Commission  just  released  in  July  2011.  Figure  1  provides  us  with  useful  
information on the total amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) over the period 2002- 
2010, and its functional breakdown. With respect to the former, the data show a steady  upward 
trend from 2002 to 2008 - with total aid almost doubling in just 6 years - and a clear-cut reversal of 
the trend from 2008 onwards. In the light of the international financial and economic crisis, the
recent downturn is perhaps not so surprising. However, if one looks at the regional breakdown of 
EU’s  commitments  over  the  period  under  consideration,  as  presented in  table  5.9 of  the  same 
Report,  Sub-Saharan  Africa  turns  out  to  be  the  only  real  net  looser.  In  detail,  while  budget 
allocations for the Americas, Asia, Northern Africa or Europe hardly change over the period 2008-
2010, in the case of Sub-Saharan countries the total amount of  aid drops from € 4.726 billion in 
2008  to € 3.929 billion in 2009 and then plummets to as little as 2.500 billion in 2010. At first  
glance,  especially  considering EU’s official  discourse on Africa,  this finding appears  somewhat 
shocking.  But the reader needs to be reminded that financing for EU development co-operation in 
the 48 Sub-Saharan countries (as well as in the other Caribbean and Pacific countries belonging to  
the ACP group33) rests directly in the hands of Member States through the EDF - which remains 
outside of the EU budget and is managed by the Commission and a special EDF Committee. Under 
these circumstances, it is plausible to argue that the financial arrangements for ACP countries leave 
more room for manoeuvre compared to EU co-operation with other parts of the world; but the issue 
calls for more careful scrutiny.
   
       Figure 1: Sectoral Breakdown of  EU Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2002-
2010
33 Cfr. note no. 15
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Figure  one  also  provides  some  interesting  information  on  ODA’s   functional 
breakdown. Given our  primary concern for  social policy issues, in this case the evidence 
seems to convey a more  positive message, namely that between 2002 and 2010 the money 
allocated for ‘social infrastructures’ increased from € 2,000 million to around € 4,000 million, 
at least apparently without suffering any negative impact from the 2008-2010 international 
crisis. And yet, by taking a closer look at what is included under this heading, the picture is 
not as rosy. In 2010, out of a total of € 4.283 billion as much as €1.941 billion was in fact 
targeted  to  ‘government  and  civil  society’,  while  only  €  626  million  were  allocated  for 
education and  € 687 million for health. Actually, for the purpose of this paper, we need to 
have  the  corresponding  breakdown  for  Sub-Saharan  countries  but  this  particular  type  of 
information is not so readily available in official EU documentation. The Commission staff 
working  paper  under  examination  does,  however,  provide  a  detailed  breakdown   of  the 
relevant commitments for the EDF – which at this stage of our research we can consider as a 
proxy of  EU allocations  in  the  area  we are interested  in34.  As table  5.18  of  the  relevant 
document shows, out of € 1.046 billion allocated for  social infrastructure only € 159 million 
34 The EDF also covers  a number of islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific, but the bulk of its expenditure is funneled 
to the 48 Sub-Saharan countries. On the other hand, by concentrating on the EDF, the analysis does not consider the 
thematic programs directly financed by the EU budget like “Investing in People”. In 2010, according to the EU working 
paper under examination – SEC (2011) 880 final - the overall amount of money funneled to Sub-Saharan Africa was € 
2.557 billion, while commitments to the EDF totaled € 2.646 million.    
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goes to education and € 269 million goes to health, in contrast to as much as € 356 million for 
good governance.  Within the overall functional distribution,  economic infrastructure ranks 
first with € 529 million and budget support ranks second with €395 million. In short, even if  
more accurate data is needed, the evidence presented so far suggests that the two policy areas 
which are most directly linked to the MDGs are far from being flooded with money. In fact, 
we find exactly the same conclusions, by turning to independent evaluations carried out by a 
variety of NGO networks. Considering that there is an extensive  production of this type of 
documents, we shall limit ourselves to mentioning two of the most widely quoted reports,  
starting with the 2015-Watch annual reports published by Alliance 2015 – a network of 7 
major  international  NGOs  which  employ  almost  10,000  local  field  staff.  To  avoid  any 
misunderstanding, the 2010 report carries the following sub-title:  The EU’s Contribution to  
the  Millennium Development  Goals  –  Keeping the  Goals  Alive.  In  tune  with  this  overall 
approach, table 2 – which is taken from the report – highlights the proportion of ODA targeted 
to education and basic health in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America. 
Table 2:  European Commission commitments to basic health and education as a percentage of  
ODA for DCI region (Asia and Latin America), Sub-Saharian Africa and of total ODA
 
The report’s following comment on the evidence stemming from the table brings into 
the picture a further element, namely the commitment which the EU originally made in 2001 
to devote 20 percent of external aid to education and health:  “The European Commission 
followed through on its  promise to implement the target  of 20 percent allocation to basic  
health  and  education  in  the  countries  of  Asia  and  Latin  America,  and  evaluations  show 
positive results for these countries; but in Africa where support for basic health and education 
is most needed, the European Commission has refused to implement this target, resulting in 
poor results for these sectors in Africa” (Alliance 2015, 2010:24)
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One can dispute the exact figures, as it is not clear how they have been calculated but  
the contrast between Latin America and Asia, on the one hand, and Sub-Saharan Africa, on 
the other,  remains stark. Further, in referring to the 20 percent benchmark, Alliance-2015 is 
attempting to put back on the political  agenda an issue which for some time the Barroso 
Commission had been trying to put aside. According to the relevant press release, in a round 
table  discussion  on “  assessing  EU co-operation  with  ACP countries  2008-2013” held  in 
Brussels in December 2007, Bernard Petit, EC Deputy Director for Development “stressed 
that aid to ACP countries should be aligned with national priorities and directed to eradicate 
poverty. He emphasized that the 20 percent benchmark for investment in the social sectors is 
outmoded and incompatible with the concept of ownership by developing countries of their 
own development strategies. He went on to say that supporting the MDGs is about economic 
growth in developing countries, not just financing health and education.”        
As one can easily notice, we are back to the controversial issue which underpins the  
strategy laid out in the European Consensus on Development and in the 2007 EU- Africa 
partnership.  To use a metaphor, it  is like a dialogue of the deaf .  While the Commission  
continues to concentrate on what it considers as  pre-requisites  for achieving the MDGs, the  
NGOs insist that  aid  should be targeted to policy areas directly linked to the MDGs. In this  
vein, the abovementioned Alliance 2015 Report contrasts EU financial support to basic health 
with total health ODA over the last decade, as figure 2 illustrates. Once more the message is  
unequivocal:  the EU is  not  doing enough;   its  budgetary allocations  to  health  policies in 
developing countries are more or less blocked at the same level, while in the period the rest of  
the world has increased aid volume by six times.
    
Figure 2: European Commission ODA and total ODA to Basic Health – 1999-2008
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Source: http://www.alliance2015.org/fileadmin/images/ODA_vs_EU_graph_on_Basic_Health.JPG
Action for global health  – another major network which comprises as many as 20 
international  NGOs -  reiterates the point but looks at total health expenditure, instead of just  
considering  basic  health  spending.   As  the  introduction  to  its  2011  Report  on  Aid 
Effectiveness for Health  assesses, “compared with total aid disbursement, European donors 
contribute  relatively  less  to  health  than  other  international  donors.  In  2008,  the  EU,  its 
member states and other European donors represented only 39 percent of health ODA, while 
accounting for 65 percent of global aid. Of the five largest economies in Europe, only the UK 
is currently on track to meet the ODA target of 0.7 percent of GNI and 0.1 percentage to 
health aid, as recommended by the WHO. Year on year, Europe represents a smaller share of 
the global health ODA” (Action for Global Health 2011, 6)
5. The way forward: why the EU should step up its role in global health policy    
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Although  the  picture  we  have  outlined  so  far  leaves  ample  room  for  further 
investigation and the figures on EU’s aid for health  provided by different  sources do not 
always  match35,  one  can hardly dispute  that  the  EU’s  contribution  to  the  achievement  of 
health-related  MDGs  and  the  overall  improvement  of  health  conditions  in  Sub-Saharan 
countries  is  relatively  small,  to  say  the  least.  In  this  last  part  of  the  paper,  we  want  to 
challenge the political and policy choices which have led to the marginalization of EU’s direct 
intervention in the health field and suggest that this option represents  a strategic opportunity  
which the EU should carefully consider,  not only in the interest of its African partners but 
also  to  pursue  more  effectively  its  ambition  of  being  a  global  ‘civil  power’.   However, 
considering the complexity of the issue,  which touches on an wide-ranging variety of geo-
political and technical factors,  we can only outline the main building blocks of our argument. 
To place the discussion into context, the first step is to recall the current position of 
Sub-Saharan  countries  with  respect  to  health-related  MDG  indicators  and  the  countries’ 
financial  commitments for health.  Tables 3 and 4  illustrate in a snapshot  how alarming the 
situation  remains  in  most  of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Table 3 ranks the 48 relevant  countries 
according  to  the  size  of  their  health  budget  allocations  as  a  proportion  of  total  public 
expenditure. As the reader can easily notice, only six countries have fulfilled the commitment 
which  the  African  heads  of  state  and government  took when  meeting  in  Abuja  in  2001, 
namely to devote 15 percent of national budgets to health. And  even  in these countries the 
picture is bleak, as they are still among the countries with the lowest indicators among one or 
more MDG categories, due to low per capita investment in health and its social determinants 
(clean water, sanitation, environment and nutrition). In fact, as many as 32 countries spend 
less than $20 per capita  in health,  which is less than half the WHO recommended barest 
minimum: a shocking contrast with Europe’s average of $ 1,252. There is no need to linger on 
the  evidence  presented  in  table  4  on  maternal  mortality,  under  five  mortality  and  life 
expectancy at birth; whatever indicator one chooses, the bottom line remains the same: Sub-
Saharan Africa witnesses major unmet healthcare needs.
But the good news is that something close to a sea change seems to be occurring within the 
global health arena, on the basis of  mounting criticism being raised at the side-effects of the single-
disease initiatives which have dominated the international scene, funnelling an
35 According to,  aid for basic health as a percentage of total EU aid  was 4.71 percent in 2005 and then dropped  to 
2.75% in 2006, 2.6% in 2007,1.5% in 2008 and 1.4%  in 2009.
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Table  3:  Health  spending  as  a  percentage  of  total  country  budget,  external  resources  as  a  
percentage of total health spending and per capita health spending in Sub-Saharan Countries 
Country name (15% Pledge)
Gen. Govt expenditure 
on health as % of gen 
govt exp.
External Resources for 
health as % of total 
health exp.
Govt Per Capita 
expenditure on health at 
average $  exchange 
rate
Rwanda 18.8% 52.4% $ 14
Botswana 17.8% 5.8% $ 290
Niger 17.8% 32.8% $ 9
Malawi 17.1% 59.6% $ 14
Zambia 16.4% 38.1% $ 35
Burkina Faso 15.8% 32.9% $ 14
Gabon 14.0% 1.8% $ 250
Chad 13.8% 17.7% $ 16
Tanzania 13.7% 43.9% $ 13
Djibouti 13.4% 30.1% $ 47
Mozambique 12.5% 60.3% $ 11
Mali 12.2% 17.6% $ 15
Senegal 12.0% 12.3% $ 25
Gambia 11.2% 34.7% $ 9
Swaziland 11.2% 12.3% $ 102
Cape Verde 11.1% 17.5% $ 88
Central African Rep. 10.9% 21.2% $ 5
Benin 10.8% 21.0% $ 13
Namibia 10.5% 21.1% $ 116
SaoTome and Principe 10.3% 50.5% $ 2
Ethiopia 10.0% 42.7% $ 4
Liberia 9.8% 50.7% $ 2
Kenya 9.7% 14.9% $ 14
Mauritius 9.4% 1.0% $ 118
Madagascar 9.3% 49.4% $ 6
South Africa 9.1% 0.9% $ 160
Uganda 8.9% 31.2% $ 6
Zimbabwe 8.9% 17.3% $ 18
Seychelles 8.8% 3.4% $ 424
Comoros 8.4% 31.9% $ 9
Lesotho 8.2% 14.3% $ 30
Sierra Leone 7.8% 33.5% $ 4
Equatorial Guinea 6.9% 3.5% $ 353
Cameroon 6.7% 8.0% $ 10
Congo (Democratic
Republic)
5.8% 51.9% $ 2
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Sudan 5.8% 6.5% $ 14
Togo 5.8% 12.3% $ 4
Congo 5.4% 3.4% $ 31
Mauritania 5.3% 18.0% $ 13
Angola 5.0% 7.0% $ 62
Guinea 4.7% 11.8% $ 3
Ghana 4.4% 22.6% $ 11
Cote d’Ivoire 4.2% 8.3% $ 4
Eritrea 4.0% 37.6% $ 4
Guinea Bissau 4.0% 33.4% $ 13
Nigeria 3.5% 5.9% $ 10
Burundi 2.4% 47.5% $ 1
Somalia N.A - -
Western Sahara N.A - -
Table 4 : Maternal mortality ratio, Under-five mortality rate and life expectancy at birth in Sub-
Saharan Countries, 2010.  
Country name Maternal Mortality 
Ratio Per 100,00 Live 
Births
Under 5 Mortality Rate 
Per 1,000 live births
Life Expectancy at birth
Rwanda 383.4 181 46
Botswana 518.8 40 50
Niger 600.7 176 57
Malawi 1,140.1 111 48
Zambia 602.9 170 42
Burkina Faso 332.4 191 52
Gabon 493.5 91 57
Chad 1,065.2 209 51
Tanzania 449.0 116 52
Djibouti 461.6 127 55
Mozambique 598.8 168 42
Mali 669.7 196 54
Senegal 400.6 114 63
Gambia 281.3 109 59
Swaziland 735.6 91 40
Cape Verde 74.7 32
Central African Rep. 1,570.4 172 44
Benin 468.9 123 56
Namibia 586.2 68 52
SaoTome and Principe 295.7 99 65
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Ethiopia 589.7 119 53
Liberia 858.9 133 45
Kenya 413.4 121 53
Mauritius 28.1 15 73
Madagascar 373.1 112 59
South Africa 236.8 59 50
Uganda 352 130 51
Zimbabwe 624.3 90 43
Seychelles NA 13 NA
Comoros 225.3 66 65
Lesotho 963 84 42
Sierra Leone 1,032.7 262 42
Equatorial Guinea 301.8 206 51
Cameroon 704.6 148 50
Congo (Democratic
Republic)
533.6 161 46
Sudan 306.3 109 58
Togo 447.1 100 58
Congo 616.8 125 55
Mauritania 712.2 119 64
Angola 592.5 158 42
Guinea 859.9 150 56
Ghana 409.2 115 60
Cote d’Ivoire 944.1 127 48
Eritrea 751.2 70 58
Guinea Bissau 804.3 198 46
Nigeria 608.3 189 47
Burundi 569.6 180 49
Somalia 647.6 142 48
Western Sahara - - -
overwhelming proportion of  total  health  spending to  HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis  and malaria.  The 
WHO has been at the forefront of the battle to re-orient international donors’ approach to health 
problems in developing countries towards the strengthening of health systems, and especially of 
primary care. In a recent interview to USAID, the WHO Director General Margaret Chan neatly 
summarized the new vision in the following terms:
“In my view, the best way is to go back to the basics: the values, principles, and approaches 
of primary health care. Abundant evidence, over decades of experience, supports this view. 
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Countries at similar levels of socioeconomic development achieve better health outcomes 
for the money when services are organized according to the principles of primary health 
care. A revitalization of primary health care is the smart move to make. To be frank, a smart  
move, in this case, is not an easy move. We are almost starting over from scratch”36
The basic arguments supporting what appears as a paradigm shift can be found in the World 
Health Report 2008, which is entitled emblematically:  Primary Health Care. Now more than Ever. 
While clearly recalling the 1978 Alma Ata declaration on primary care, the approach endorsed by 
the  Report cannot simply be traced back to that historical turning point. Given its importance  in 
opening -  in our view -  new opportunities for EU’s action in the field, it is perhaps useful to recall  
its main considerations:
1. Diseases and health conditions that enjoy a temporary spotlight in rich countries garner the 
most attention and money
2. Efforts to combat HIV/AIDS have brought more money to the field but have not always 
had a beneficial impact on public health outside their own niche.
3. A side effect of single-disease initiatives is to take over the healthcare workers who once 
dealt with malaria, dysentery, vaccination programs, maternal health and other issues that 
lack activist constituencies. Due to pay differential between the wages offered by local 
governments and those offered by international organizations, the latter can easily outbid 
national authorities for the services of local health talent
4. The top three killers  in  most  poor  countries  are  maternal  death around childbirth  and 
pediatric respiratory and intestinal infections.
5. Maternal mortality data is a very sensitive surrogate for the overall status of healthcare 
systems
6. The major driver of life expectancy is child survival.
All of the abovementioned ingredients lead to a clear-cut policy prescription: the way ahead 
for improving the conditions of 80 percent of the people in developing countries who do not have 
access to health facilities is to concentrate all the efforts on strengthening health systems.  It is our  
contention  that  the  EU enjoys  in  this  respect  a  comparative  advantage  vis-à-vis  other  western 
donors - first of all the US - and emerging powers. 
36 USAID, Frontlines,  April-May 2011- www.usaid.org 
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Meeting the challenge ahead is not just a matter of financial resources, it is also a matter of 
political, technical and administrative capacity in the design and management of complex health 
systems. Needless to say, the EU can rely on a long-standing and successful experience in public  
health  systems.  The  diversification  of  European  social  protection  systems  in  different  welfare 
regimes  based  on  the  Bismarkian  or  the  Beveridgean  legacy  provides  a  further  advantage,  as 
Member States have been able to build up  an institutional capacity  in both social insurance and 
universal healthcare models - which is unparalleled across the world. Notably, while the United 
States  score  very  well  in  terms  of  healthcare  quality,  research  and  technology,  their  record  is 
certainly not as brilliant when it comes to guaranteeing access to their top-standard facilities. Albeit 
for  different  reasons,  emerging powers  are  also  at  a  disadvantage:  whereas  in  labour-intensive 
economic sectors like building, road construction or  manufacturing the BRICs can easily outbid 
European countries,  in the health field this is not the case, with the partial exception of India. Only 
recently, thanks to the technical support of the World Health Organization, China has been able to 
improve the production standards of its pharmaceutical industry and only in 2006  President Hu 
Jintao put forward a series of measures to increase the number of hospitals and provide medical  
equipment to Africa.
But the picture is rapidly changing; “whether as member states in international organizations, 
as bilateral donors or through participation in international financial consortia as the G20, the BRIC 
countries,  which  have  now been  joined  by  South  Africa,  are  using  their  wealth  and  status  to 
influence  the  outcome  of  global  healthy  policy  discussion,  and  many  are  supporting  overseas 
health-related  activities  to  foster  solidarity,  create  alliance  and  strengthen  their  international 
position.”37 Among others, the BRICS recently launched a strong action concerning medicines and 
vaccines  in the African Continent  -  a move which probably explains  the May 2011 impressive 
lowering of prices by the pharmaceutical industry - which the WHO General Director defined as a 
‘sea change’. Turning to the other side of the Atlantic, although the bulk of US resources is still  
funneled to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, over the last two years the United States have also started to 
upgrade their financial commitment to health systems and Obama launched a $63 billion six-year 
‘US Global Health Initiative.’38
Last but not least, African Governments and civil society organizations are starting to raise 
their  voice against  disease-specific  initiatives  which risk marginalizing national  health  policies. 
Indeed, the literature tends to pay more attention to the various steps which have been taken at the 
37 Center for Strategic International Studies,  K.E. Bliss (ed.) Key players in Global Health, www.csis.org
  
38 www.state.gov
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African regional level to define a common social policy framework39. In our view, the social policy 
declarations enhanced by the African Union and its committees over the last decade have  not yet 
trickled down to the level of national political debates and hard politics. Twenty years of neo-liberal 
structural  adjustment  policies  have  left  Health  Ministers  in  a  very  weak position  compared to 
Finance and Economic Ministers. The title of a recent Report which the New York Academy of 
Medicine and the African Centre for Global Health jointly issued goes right to the point in hinting 
to Strong Ministries for Strong Systems. 
There is  no short-cut  for  providing a  successful  and long-lasting solution to  Sub-Saharan 
health problems - which have been deteriorating for too long a time. This is certainly a daunting 
task but it would be a pity for the European Union not to the grasp the political opportunity offered 
by two upcoming deadlines: the delayed 10th EDF mid-term review and,  more importantly,  the 
November 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Cameron and Obama are striving 
to  take  the  lead40,  it  is  in  the  EU’s  interest  not  to  remain  in  the  backstage.  The  historical  
development of European Welfare States amply documents that social entitlements have played a 
crucial role in tightening the bonds between the State and its citizens. Instead of channeling most of 
its  activities  into  policy areas  in  which  it  is  bound to  loose  in  the  competition  with emerging 
economies, the EU would be better off by shifting its  attention to the improvement of national  
healthcare systems in developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa where unmet need 
are highest. In our view, the winning strategy is to involve – both in Europe and in Africa - the  
various  levels  of  the  health  administration,  medical  associations,  private  and  public  research 
agencies and existing civil society organizations by resorting to horizontal twinning (ministry to 
ministry,   hospital  to  hospital  etc.).  Getting  engaged  in  multi-track  health  diplomacy  and  co-
operation, along with  directly contributing to the achievement of the MDGs, can only improve the 
EU’s political  leverage and its  current  image in  the eyes of the African citizenry at  large.  Our 
suggestions need strong and long-term political commitments by European  leaders and institutions 
which at present are not in sight, yet – as the Latin motto suggests -  Fortuna audaces iuvat. 
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